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1 Introduction
After the second world war, most of European governments were currently supposed and
required to coordinate and stimulate the reconstruction effort of national economies devas-
tated by the war, to provide the public goods and services in Health, Education, Research
and all kinds of public infrastructures which have made possible the substantial economic
growth of this period, and, when possible, to regulate this growth by contra-cyclical fiscal
and monetary policies. Sixty years after, as a result of the movement of globalization–
regionalization of all economies over the world and the construction of large economic
areas on the model of the European Union common market, the common representation
of governments’ tasks has progressively but dramatically changed. Public firms have been
privatized, the public goods provision has been largely deregulated, welfare programs are
cut and budget deficits are fought. These evolutions have been passively accepted in the
general context of the weakening of the concept of ‘Etat-Nation’, under the increasing
influence of liberal and free-trade ideology. Roughly speaking, even if a number of certi-
tudes are nowadays seriously cracked, the paradigm of a central, omniscient, omnipotent
(and benevolent) policy maker has been relaxed, replaced by the idea of a multitude of
public objectives defined at several, more or less coordinated, levels: national, interna-
tional, regional, or even branch level. To fulfill these objectives, most of the traditional
economic policy instruments, supposed to contradict international agreements, are pre-
sented as inadequate, while the others mainly focus on establishing rules that guarantee
the fair competition of private firms.
One purpose of this paper is to study how the changes in the common representa-
tion of governments’ tasks are reflected into the evolution of the public goods provision
∗A first draft of this paper was prepared for the Paris HPE Conference (December 2008). This
version has benefitted from the comments of the participants, especially of F. Adaman and Y.M.
Madra who presented a paper at the same session. Special thanks go to U¨. Zenginobuz for long
standing discussions on mechanism design, to P. Courre`ge, F. Gardes, A. Lapidus, and to an
anonymous referee for constructive suggestions. Conclusions are obviously mine. A theoretical
exposition of equilibrium concepts for public goods provision can be found in Florenzano (2009),
and general overviews on mechanism design in Jackson (2003), Mookherjee (2008), RSAS (2007).
theory, especially at its most formalized level. Specifically, recall that the fifties are the
years of creation and formalization of the modern general equilibrium theory. During this
period, armed with the ambition of providing a coherent framework for understanding
market functioning in classical and non-classical environments, mechanism design theory
has difficulty in elaborating a general definition for the design of institutions through
which individuals interact. In the following decades, simultaneously with the definition of
the research program of its initiators, the Arrow–Debreu model1 has progressively been
enriched in order to weaken assumptions and to accommodate, one after the other, most
of the different issues tackled by neoclassical economics. The publication by Samuelson
in 1954 of an influential paper stating in a general equilibrium framework the optimality
problem associated with the provision of public goods and the distribution of tax burdens
paved the way for the definition of equilibrium concepts for an economy with public goods.
Such an objective was diversely addressed by the scientific community of general equi-
librium. In the seventies some general equilibrium models were studying the equilibrium of
“second best” economies where the existence of taxes, lump sum transfers and the govern-
mental provision of public goods were explicitly modeled as exogenous data. More or less
at the same period, Russian theorists analyzed general equilibrium of “mixed economies”
with some goods publicly provided in fixed quantities and/or at fixed prices and resold at
competitive prices on secondary competitive markets. The embedding in general equilib-
rium models of pricing rules fixed by the government for goods, which are useful from a
public policy viewpoint but that market may fail to provide, was also actively worked out.
One could evoke in addition the abundant theoretical elaboration in this time on planning
of mixed economies. In all these theoretical works, the rationality of public choices is im-
plicitly assumed to be determined outside the functioning of the competitive system. In
counterpart, governmental interventions, whose objectives are taken as given by the agents
of the competitive system, are assumed to determine the characteristics of consumers’ and
producers’ behavior and, in particular, to influence the production possibilities of firms.
The task of general equilibrium theorists is to investigate the possibility of equilibrium,
given these public policies, and eventually to look for minimizing the distortions introduced
by the government interventions.
This is in contrast with two polar equilibrium models, worked out at the same period,
where the provision of public goods enters as an argument in consumer’s utility function
and so determines the equilibrium amount of their provision and their equilibrium price.
In the first one, whose likelihood is attested by the development of charities, consumers
“provide” public goods, that is, buy them at their equilibrium market price in order to
put them at the disposal of the other consumers. In the second one, consumers pay at
personalized prices, called Lindahl prices, their common consumption of public goods pro-
1One generally adds a reference to McKenzie whose responsibility in setting different elements of the
general equilibrium framework is undisputed.
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duced by competitive producers. Both models, whose consistency is proved under the same
standard assumptions, have as a common feature the fact that public goods are provided
without intervention of any public institution. Their respective drawbacks are at the ori-
gin of the huge development, since the eighties, of the mechanism design literature called
for solving the sub-optimality of the private provision equilibrium and the evasion by free-
riding of the Lindahl–Foley equilibrium. Replacing equilibrium of competitive economies
by equilibrium of mechanisms whose aim is to implement desirable allocations or to allow
for a true revealing of preferences has consequences on the role assigned to government
institutions by the public goods provision theory. Roughly speaking, in equilibrium mod-
els, the government is supposed to stimulate, coordinate, correct, or plan the competitive
functioning of private ownership economies as justified by the welfare theorems. With
the today ubiquitous mechanism design in the theoretical literature, the completely de-
centralized functioning of any system has become an objective per se that the function of
government is to enforce.
In the sequel, we follow this by no way linear evolution beginning with the simulta-
neous publication of the Arrow–Debreu (1954) paper, birth announcement of the modern
general equilibrium theory, and of Samuelson (1954, 1955)’s papers defining public goods.
Our objective is to analyze how, after 1954, the theories of general equilibrium and of
mechanism design have integrated in their framework the problems of public goods pro-
vision and more generally of public policy in response to collective needs of the society.
Such an historical analysis is generally missing in books, in other respects important, on
the history of general equilibrium (as, for instance, Ingrao and Israel (1990)).2
We will see how the theoretical evolution of general equilibrium theory superposes af-
ter 1954 two lines of research which overlap, mobilizing sometimes the same researchers,
without it be possible to speak of two schools of thought only one of which would accept
Samuelson’s definition of public goods. As to the elaboration of equilibrium concepts for an
economy whose definition incorporates explicitly the presence of Samuelson public goods,
two equilibrium definitions persist in the literature, with however a progressive reversal
of the relative weight of private provision of public goods relative to their financing with
Lindahl prices, at the advantage of public goods private provision equilibrium. Both equi-
librium definitions contribute to reinforcing the idea that, ideally, government institutions
could (or should) not interfere in the provision of public goods. However, their respective
drawbacks confirm the evidence claimed by Samuelson that, in an economy with public
goods, no equilibrium concept can be supported as a market mechanism.
Around the same time, building on the extension of planning procedures to the pro-
vision of public goods, mechanism design theory finds its first point of application with
the resolution of the ‘free-rider problem’ and the introduction of the notion of ‘incentive
2As is still to be done the history of the application of the Invisible Hand paradigm to most of specialized
chapters of general equilibrium theory (time, uncertainty, finance, differential information, ...).
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compatibility’. Since then, while leaving unsolved the repeated impossibility theorems
of general equilibrium with public goods, mechanism design has become the dominant
paradigm for the normative analysis of a wide variety of economic and social issues going
from social choice theory and voting systems to optimal allocation of indivisible objects
and analysis of many other regulation institutions designed at macro or micro levels. In
view of the correlative complexity of the system of public policy decision centers, the
public policy objectives become for these analyses something on which the economist has
little to say, leaving unset and/or unsolved the general issue of a definition and theoretical
foundations for public policy in market economies.
In what follows, Section 2 presents the framework and the research agenda of gen-
eral equilibrium theory. Section 3 introduces Samuelson’s definition of public goods and
considers different equilibrium models where the tasks of a government for financing or
providing public (social, merit or whatsoever) goods are analyzed without reference to
this definition. On the contrary, Section 4 formalizes the equilibrium concepts related
with Samuelson’s definition, while Section 5 describes their respective drawbacks. Section
6 is devoted to the solutions offered by mechanism design theory. In each of these some-
what technical sections, we have tried to ease the formal definitions we give of different
equilibrium concepts, in order to allow for reading of this paper by non specialists. At
the end of the paper, a conclusion section investigates the meaning of the evolution of
the public goods provision theory relative to the issues raised at the beginning of this
introduction as well as in the title of the paper.
2 Creation and development of general equilibrium theory
General equilibrium theory is a unified framework for studying, in the Walras tradition,
the general interdependence of economic activities: consumption, production, exchange.
Arrow–Debreu (1954)’s paper is in the same time the seminal definition of a so-called
‘private ownership economy’ and an equilibrium existence result proving consistency of
the model.
The list of data
E =
(
RL, (Xi, Pi, ei)i∈I , (Yj)j∈J , (θij) i∈I
j∈J
)
is the prototype description of an economy. L is a (finite) set of goods, so that RL is the
commodity space and the price space of the model. I is a (finite) set of consumers and
Xi, Pi and ei represent respectively the set of possible consumption plans, the preferences
and the initial endowment of consumer i ∈ I. J is a (finite) set of producers (firms),
and Yj is the set of possible production plans of firm j ∈ J . For each i and j, θij
represents the share of consumer i in the profit of firm j. In the above definition, all data
of the model may be thought of as historically and socially determined, as the result of
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past evolutions. The distribution parameters (consumers’ initial endowments and profit
shares) define the institutional data of the economy, result of the current social consensus,
but also make precise in some sense what is of the responsibility of State in the economy
under consideration. The competitive (price-taker) behavior of agents defines the model:
a competitive equilibrium (the solution concept) is the couple of an allocation and of a price
vector such that markets clear (the allocation is said to be feasible), and, at equilibrium
prices, each producer maximizes its profit, each consumer optimizes her preferences in her
consumption set under her budget constraint. In this functioning, the role of firms is purely
technical, more suited for ‘regulated’ than for privately owned firms characterized in the
‘real’ world by much more complex strategies than the simple profit maximization,3 and
government is absent from the model. Sovereignty of price-taking consumers is the driving
force of the standard general equilibrium model.
The formalization and the definition adopted by Arrow and Debreu in 1954 for what
is often denominated ‘Walrasian equilibrium’ enabled them to solve the equilibrium exis-
tence problem addressed before the second world war by A. Wald (1936)4 for the Walras
formalization and by J. von Neumann (1937) in a somewhat different framework. Once
the consistency of the model is guaranteed by an equilibrium existence theorem (an equi-
librium exists under reasonable assumptions supposed to represent observable features of
the reality), during the twenty following years, the research agenda of general equilibrium
theory was progressively made precise, centered on:
- Sufficient conditions for equilibrium existence, a constantly revisited issue with each
generalization or extension of the model.
- Optimality properties of equilibrium, in some sense the alpha and omega of general
equilibrium theory. According to the first welfare theorem, the equilibrium allocation
is optimal from consumers’ point of view, a mere tautology for convenient definitions
of equilibrium and Pareto optimality. Under continuity, convexity, boundedness
assumptions on the economy, local nonsatiation of consumers at any component of a
feasible consumption allocation, the second welfare theorem states that, given a total
amount of available resources, any optimal feasible allocation can be achieved as an
equilibrium, that is decentralized by prices, through a convenient redistribution of
consumers’ wealth (i.e. endowments and profit shares). Just before 1954, that is
before the publication of their joint paper on existence, comparable second welfare
theorem results had been separately obtained by Arrow (1951) and Debreu (1954).
- Social and institutional stability properties of equilibrium: the equilibrium allocation
belongs to the core of the economy, that is to the set of allocations that no coalition
3This remark was recurrently used to stress that the Arrow-Debreu model fits better with a centrally
planned economy than with a capitalist economy.
4A paper that follows a series of papers published by K. Menger (Ed.) Ergebnisse eines Mathematischen
Kolloquiums, 1935-36.
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of consumers can block using the resources and property rights on the firms of
its members. Conversely, under assumptions analogous to the ones used in the
second welfare theorem, the Debreu–Scarf theorem shows that an allocation which
belongs to the core of all replica economies can be decentralized with prices as
an equilibrium allocation. Both results were first proved in Debreu–Scarf (1963)
for an exchange economy. They are considered as the translation into the general
equilibrium framework of what is called ‘Edgeworth conjecture’ on the asymptotic
functioning of a competitive economy: the set of core allocations shrinks to the set
of equilibrium allocations when the number of consumers tends to infinity.
- For the sake of comparative analysis, study of uniqueness and continuity properties
with respect to the initial data of the economy.
- Computation of equilibria.
The problems related with dynamic optimization or with the definition of dynamic mod-
els of temporary equilibrium are missing in this agenda. The names of Kantorovich and
Grandmont are respectively attached with these problems which do not concern the essen-
tially static equilibrium concepts to be reported in Section 4 for an economy with public
goods.
After its creation, the general equilibrium model was progressively enriched in order
to accommodate, one after the other, most of the different issues successively tackled by
neoclassical theory: intertemporal equilibrium, microeconomic foundations of macroeco-
nomics, risk and uncertainty, financial markets, asymmetry of information, to quote only
important issues among many others. The extraordinary plasticity of the general equilib-
rium paradigm explains its longevity. Defining public goods, introducing their production,
provision, and consumption in the general equilibrium framework was a natural objective,
a way for explaining the rationale of public expenditure and of its financing by individual
taxes and subsidies. The publication in 1954-55 of Samuelson’s papers was obviously to
have an impact on the contribution of general equilibrium theory to public economics.
3 Samuelson’s definition of public goods and its limited im-
pact
A ‘collective consumption good’ is defined by Samuelson (1954,1955) as a good whose
each individual consumption (or using in production) leads to no subtraction from any
other individual’s consumption. The simple definition brought on during more than two
decades a host of discussions. Their common characteristic is to call for combining in
more flexible or more complex ways (see James 1971, Margolis 1955, Meyer 1971, Sandmo
1973, Weymark 2004) the two characteristics of their consumption (non-excludability, non-
rejectibility) assigned by Samuelson to the restrictive definition of (pure) public goods. All
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these critics call for considering all kinds of ”impure” public goods. Nobody5 questions
the main novelty of the paper which is not to recognize the social character of the benefits
associated with the provision of public goods (public utilities) but to extend the domain
of consumers’ sovereignty to the choice of the amount of public goods to be provided. In
other words, Samuelson’s papers cause Public Economics to shift from a political economy
approach to public expenditure to a theory of the demand for and the supply of public
goods and services.
The problem dealt with by Samuelson, and by each one of the above quoted critics, is
the research of (first order) conditions that guarantee optimality of the public goods provi-
sion, from the point of view of consumers (Pareto optimality) or from the point of view of
a social planner whose utility is depending on individual consumers’ utilities. Conclusions
are rather negative. Optimum exists, is multiple depending on the particular form of the
social utility function. But the externality in consumer’s preferences, inherent to the def-
inition of public goods, prevents any implementation by a market mechanism (consumers
have no interest to reveal their preferences, their willingness to pay) or by a planning pro-
cedure (which would require from an omniscient planner to know all consumers’ marginal
rate of substitutions between private and public goods).
The impact of Samuelson’s papers on the development of general equilibrium was nei-
ther immediate nor complete. As remarked in the introduction, important contributions
of general equilibrium theory to the analysis of public interventions have been made inde-
pendently of Samuelson’s public goods provision problem, not necessarily outside the list
of other functions that Samuelson (1955) concedes to public expenditure at the end of his
article: redistributing income, ‘paternalistic policies’, provision of goods that market may
fail to provide, correction of negative externalities. Let us quote:
- General equilibrium of second best economies Under this sub-title, we refer to a
series of papers (Fourgeaud 1969, Mantel 1975, Shafer–Sonnenschein 1976, Shoven
1974, Sontheimer 1971), published in the seventies. Through different hypotheses
specific of each paper, they have as a common feature to study mixed or ‘second
best’ economies where the presence of a public sector is explicitly modeled and to
consider taxes, lump sum transfers, government consumption of private goods, and
the (possible) public provision of certain (non marketed) goods as exogenous data
resulting from public policy decisions whose analysis should be kept separated from
the analysis of the competitive functioning of the economy.
- Equilibrium of ‘mixed economies’ with certain goods publicly provided in fixed quan-
tities and/or at fixed prices This literature (see Vasil’ev–Wiesmeth 2008 and its
5With the notable exception of an unpublished paper, written in 1956 and to appear in this issue
(Peacock and Wiseman, 2010), which qualifies of futile ‘the attempts to explain the economic activities of
governments by use of simplistic conceptions of welfare economics’.
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Russian references) investigates existence and (constrained and unconstrained) effi-
ciency of equilibrium in the context of mixed economies characterized by the possible
presence and interplay of dual markets for each commodity. On the first one, mar-
ket prices are fixed and the allocation of goods is determined by rationing schemes
and governmental orders. On the second market, flexible prices resulting from the
market mechanism coordinate demand and supply. This model, first elaborated in
the eighties by Russian economists, may seem today largely anecdotal, even if for
their authors it is supposed to be a still valid approximation to the main features of
the government intervention in transition economies as those of some Central and
Eastern European countries of the former Soviet Union.
- Embedding in general equilibrium model of pricing rules fixed by the government
for goods that market may fail to provide. On the contrary, this theoretical anal-
ysis is one of the deepest achievements of general equilibrium theory for the last
thirty years, and an important chapter of Public Economics which has little to do
with Samuelson’s public goods definition. Re-visiting a long and controversial de-
bate (Boiteux 1956, Coase 1946, Hotelling 1938, Lerner 1944, Ramsey 1927) on
pricing, regulating and financing the production of public utilities (like public trans-
portation, electric power plants and many other examples) produced by firms with
increasing returns (to scale) technologies, this literature6 extends equilibrium def-
inition, existence and optimality properties to economies which satisfy neither the
differentiability assumptions made in all just above quoted papers nor the convexity
assumptions of the standard general equilibrium theory. The mathematical tool for
this extension is the notion of normal cone whose (not unique) definition always
captures in the same time the ideas of profit maximization in the convex case and
of ‘normal’ in the smooth case. Several statements of the second welfare theorem
for a production economy have been provided, beginning with Guesnerie (1975).
Whatever be the chosen notion of normal cone in the subsequent papers,7 in order
to decentralize Pareto optimal allocations of an economy, firms must be instructed to
behave in conformity with the (necessary) first order conditions of Pareto optimality,
that is to choose prices in the normal cone to their component of the Pareto optimal
feasible allocation.
In the corresponding equilibrium definition, firms are described by the pricing rule
they are instructed to follow. In addition, a wealth structure defines, in the list of
data of the economy, the income of consumers as a function of current prices and of
the current production allocation, defined so as to guarantee that, at equilibrium,
consumers can finance the possible losses of firms. Under appropriate assumptions,
6One will find a first excellent account in the introduction to a 1988 JME special issue (Cornet 1988) .
7Depending on the assumptions made on the production sets, each definition has a different implication
for the economic significance of the price decentralization result. Clarke’s normal cone is considered as the
full generalization of the marginal cost pricing rule.
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equilibrium exists but one should notice that, for nonconvex production economies,
the first welfare theorem does not hold: an equilibrium allocation needs not be Pareto
optimal. The effect of particular wealth structures, in terms of efficiency of the
equilibrium allocation or of alteration of the income distribution, is the translation
in the general equilibrium model of the above quoted and still controversial debate
on entry fees versus lump sum transfers for financing the deficit of regulated firms.
4 Equilibrium concepts for Samuelson’s public goods pro-
vision
4.1 A private ownership economy with public goods
Let now L be the set of private goods and, according to Samuelson’s definition, K be the
set of pure public goods, so that RL × RK is the commodity space and the price space of
the equilibrium model.
The list of data
E =
(
RL × RK , (Xi, Pi, ei)i∈I , (Yj)j∈J , (θij) i∈I
j∈J
)
is the prototype description of a private ownership economy with public goods, where now
each consumer i ∈ I has her consumption set Xi ⊂ RL × RK and her initial endowment
ei ∈ RL × RK , each producer (firm) j ∈ J jointly produces private and public goods
(Yj ⊂ RL × RK). If production technology sets Yj are assumed to be convex and thus to
allow for a profit maximizing behavior of producers, there is no need to reconsider the role
in wealth distribution of the profit shares θij of consumers on profits of firms.
For defining equilibrium concepts, the difficulty begins with the interpretation of the
set Xi for each consumer i and thus of her preferences Pi.
- Either for consumer i, (xi, x
g
i ) ∈ Xi represents the couple of a consumption of private
goods and of a private provision of public goods.
Then, the utility for consumer i of (xi, x
g
i ) depends on her private goods consumption
and on the sum of her own provision of public goods and of the private provisions of
the other agents. Until 1976, there will be no general equilibrium existence theorem
for such dependent preferences.
- Or (xi, Gi) ∈ Xi represents the couple of a consumption of private goods and of a
claim for an amount of public goods.
Then, at equilibrium, all consumers have to agree on a same provision of public
goods, and the definition of feasibility for an allocation (”markets clear”) has to be
reformulated.
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These preliminary considerations explain the multiplicity of equilibrium concepts and the
order in which they appear in the literature.
4.2 Lindahl–Foley equilibrium (1970)
The Lindahl–Foley equilibrium corresponds to what is called by Samuelson the Lindahl
solution. At equilibrium, consumers consume a same amount G of public goods and face
personalized prices for public goods, so that an equilibrium is the couple of a consumption-
production allocation
(
(xi)i∈I , G
)
, (yj , y
g
j )j∈J
)
and of a non null price vector
(
(p, (pgi )i∈I
)
such that
• markets clear for private goods while for public goods, total supply of firms equals
consumers’ common demand (Lindahl–Foley feasibility),
and, at equilibrium prices,
• each producer maximizes its profit p · yj + (
∑
i∈I p
g
i ) · ygj , using the common private
goods price vector and the sum of personalized price vectors for public goods as
production price vector for public goods,
• each consumer, using the common private goods price vector and her personalized
public goods price vector, optimizes her preferences in her consumption set under
her budget constraint.
After some attempts (Johansen 1963, Samuelson 1969) calling for the application of Lin-
dahl’s ideas (see Lindahl 1919 and 1928) in the reconstruction of a ‘pseudo demand’
approach and the definition of a ‘pseudo equilibrium’ concept,8 the definition of Lindahl–
Foley equilibrium and a proof of its existence emerged in a paper of Foley (1970) and a
french working-paper of Fabre-Sender (1969).9 The now classical equilibrium existence
proof (well explained in Milleron (1972)) for a private ownership economy with public
goods consists in building an economy with only private goods defined on a commodity
space of an increased dimension, by considering each consumer’s bundle of public goods
8As emphasized by Johansen, in the Lindahl solution, the extension of expenditures for satisfying public
wants and the distribution of the corresponding tax burden must be determined simultaneously. This
simultaneity requirement is precisely the one of an equilibrium definition based on the benefit taxation
principle. However, for Lindahl (1919), “the concepts of supply and demand as well as the object of
exchange are of a special nature ... and equilibrium is reached by agreement between the two protagonists
rather than by free competition”. For Samuelson (1969), agreement a` la Lindahl through a parliamentary
bargaining among political parties and pseudo equilibrium are subject to the same criticism. In particular,
the ‘pseudo equilibrium’ concept has no relevance to motivated market behavior.
9One should also notice that appears, independently but at the same time, the first definition and
existence proof for an equilibrium concept with personalized prices of economies with consumption exter-
nalities. The model studied by Bergstrom (1970) is that of an exchange economy with only private goods
where the utility of each consumer is dependent on the utility gained by all other consumers on their own
consumption.
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as a separate group of commodities, and applying to the corresponding economy some
known equilibrium existence result which will imply equilibrium existence in the original
public goods economy.
Besides the usual convexity, continuity, boundedness assumptions for the economy and
local no-satiation of consumer’s preferences at components of feasible allocations, condi-
tions assumed by Foley for equilibrium existence were quite general with four exceptions
which can be partially or totally dispensed with: (1) Consumers have no initial endow-
ment in public goods (for each i ∈ I, ei = (ωi, 0)); (2) Public goods are not production
inputs; (3) Consumer’s utility is increasing in public goods (no public bad); (4) The overall
production set is supposed to be a convex cone (constant returns to scale).
More important, the first and second welfare theorems hold. An equilibrium alloca-
tion is Pareto optimal and belongs to the core. Conversely, any Pareto optimal Lindahl
feasible allocation can be decentralized using convenient lump sum transfers and con-
sumers’ personalized prices for public goods. This is true even without the second and
third assumptions and if constant returns to scale are replaced by the weaker assumption
of a convex productive system. Such a result confirms the role generally given in general
equilibrium to public redistribution policy for achieving Pareto optimality.
4.3 Wicksell–Foley public competitive equilibrium (1967-1970)
The definition of the Wicksell–Foley public competitive equilibrium is an interesting vari-
ation on optimality properties of the Lindahl–Foley equilibrium. A Wicksell–Foley public
competitive equilibrium is the triple of a Lindahl–Foley feasible allocation
(
(xi)i∈I , G
)
, a
price vector for private and public goods (p, pg), and a vector of consumers’ taxes (ti)i∈I
such that for equilibrium prices (p, pg),
• the sum of equilibrium taxes ∑i∈I ti finances the cost of production of the equilib-
rium public good provision G,
• each producer maximizes his profit,
• given the equilibrium provision of public goods, each consumer chooses a consump-
tion of private goods so as to optimize her preferences under her after taxes budget
constraint p · xi + ti ≤ p · ωi, and
• There is no other public sector proposal (G, (ti)i∈I), in the form of a revised vector
of public goods provision together with a vector of taxes on consumers in order to
finance together with the sum of equilibrium profits the revised provision of public
goods, that makes every consumer better off.
In other words, the grand coalition cannot block with another public sector proposal the
equilibrium public sector proposal
(
G, (ti)i∈I
)
. Even if the realized consensus is rather
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negative, (‘a kind of last resort, or worst case’, as written by Foley (1967)), this condition
can be thought of as capturing and translating into an equilibrium process Wicksell’s idea
(Wicksell 1896) of an unanimous consent on the couple of a public goods provision together
with the set of financing taxes.10
Two easy and not surprising properties are the following:
1. A Lindahl–Foley equilibrium allocation is a Wicksell–Foley public competitive equi-
librium allocation which is, in turn, Pareto optimal;
2. For an economy E , under the usual conditions for their decentralization with prices,
the set of Pareto optimal Lindahl–Foley feasible allocations and the set of Wicksell–
Foley public competitive equilibrium allocations coincide.
A more interesting property, stated and proved by Foley in his (1967) PhD dissertation
(Foley 1967) under restrictive assumptions, but not reported in his Econometrica paper
(Foley 1970) and today forgotten, shows that Pareto optimality of the allocation is compat-
ible with an equitable repartition of the tax burden: there exists a Wicksell–Foley public
competitive equilibrium where the tax paid by each consumer is proportional to his equi-
librium income. Foley even conjectures the existence of a public competitive equilibrium
for an arbitrary progressive income tax.
4.4 Public goods private provision equilibrium (1976-1986)
The idea of private provisions of public goods corresponds to the idea of private donations
to charity, campaign funds of political parties and so on. And papers abound during the
period on theoretical (and experimental) analysis of voluntary contributions to schools,
churches, etc., in relation with the free-rider problem.
The equilibrium definition in the public goods private provision model differs from the
standard general equilibrium definition only in the fact that the utility for a consumer i ∈ I
of a couple (xi, x
g
i ) of a private goods consumption and a public goods private provision
depends on her private goods consumption and on the sum of all individual provisions of
public goods. For the same private ownership economy with public goods E as above, an
equilibrium is the couple of an allocation
(
(xi, x
g
i )i∈I , (yj , y
g
j )j∈J
)
and of a non null price
vector
(
p, pg
)
for private and public goods such that
• markets clear for private goods and private provisions of public goods (total supply
of firms equals consumers’ demand),
10For Wicksell (and later Lindahl), agreement should be achieved through parliamentary discussions, the
meaning of which was the object of controversial comments (Silvestre 2003). In the equilibrium process,
one may imagine a kind of Walrasian auctioneer drawing up, together with private and public goods prices,
successive public sector proposals until an agreement is reached.
12
and, at equilibrium prices,
• each producer j maximizes its profit p · yj + pg · ygj ,
• each consumer i, taking as given the equilibrium public goods provisions of other
consumers,
∑
h 6=i x
g
h, optimizes (from the point of view of her preferences and under
her budget constraint) her consumption of private goods and her own provision of
public goods.
As, at equilibrium, consumers take as given the equilibrium behavior of other consumers
with respect to their public goods private provision, this equilibrium may be considered
as an ‘equilibrium a` la Nash’.
Equilibrium exists under the same standard conditions as in the standard general
equilibrium model. But it has no reason to be optimal. It is only ‘constrained’ optimal,
that is, optimal for each agent given the public goods provisions of the other agents. The
intellectual tool for the equilibrium existence result is an equilibrium existence result for an
abstract economy11 where preferences of players formally depend on the current strategies
of the other players, to be found in a Shafer–Sonnenschein paper (Shafer–Sonnenschein
1976) for which public goods private provision was not the concern. Actually, this paper
was belonging to and following a series of equilibrium existence results for second best
economies. Public goods, evoked at the very end of the paper, were, in the ideas of
Shafer–Sonnenschein, to be publicly provided. For this reason, the interest of the paper
for public goods private provision equilibrium was ignored, as was and is still ignored
its potential interest for ”warm glow” and any other form of benevolent, malevolent, or
‘concerned for face’ public goods provision.
As far as equilibrium existence is only concerned, the celebrated paper “On the private
provision of public goods” (Bergstrom–Blume–Varian 1986), represents a regression with
respect to the Shafer–Sonnenschein equilibrium model. The B–B–V model allows for
one public good (extended to several, at the end of the paper) and one private good.
Equilibrium existence in this simple model may be seen as a consequence of equilibrium
existence in Shafer–Sonnenschein’s paper. But Bergstrom, Blume and Varian study also
uniqueness and sensitivity of equilibrium to wealth distribution. This makes for their
11An abstract economy is a ‘generalized game’ Γ =
`
(Xi, αi, Pi)i∈N
´
where in addition to his strategy set
and preferences defined on his strategy set, a constraint correspondence defines for each agent the set of
strategies he can choose given the strategies of the other agents. An equilibrium of the generalized game
is a t-uple of individual strategies where each agent optimizes his preferences in his constraint set. The
idea of deducing equilibrium existence in an economy from an equilibrium existence result in an associated
abstract economy where an additional agent, the ‘Walrasian auctioneer’, chooses prices so as to maximize
the total excess demand traces back to Arrow–Debreu (1954). The decisive improvement of S–S’s paper
was to allow preferences in the abstract economy to depend on the strategies chosen by other agents. In
the original economy, preferences may thus depend on the current allocation and prices.
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epigones,12 the interest of their paper. To know if and to what extent private provision
of public goods can be (Pareto) improved by government interventions, is still today an
issue and an object of research.
5 Drawbacks of the different equilibrium concepts
Existence and optimality properties of the previous equilibrium concepts strongly depend
on convexity assumptions on consumers’ preferences and production. On the consumption
side, nonconvexity may come from indivisibility in the quantities to be consumed, or is
related with lack of risk aversion in preferences. We will neglect these causes of noncon-
vexity. On the production side, most of so-called collective goods (public utilities) are
classical examples of decreasing costs and are goods that market may fail to provide. This
is one of the main drawbacks of the results reported in Section 4.
As we have seen in Section 3, even if such goods are considered as private goods from
consumers’ point of view, non convexity on the production side requires public interven-
tion for enforcing pricing rules and designing income distribution rules allowing consumers
to survive and to finance a possible deficit in their production. Regulation of firms and the
necessity of this alteration of distribution rules with respect to the institutional definition
of private ownership economies set the issue of new foundations for public policy of mar-
ket economies without providing means for calculating and implementing an appropriate
public policy.
When goods produced under nonconvex technologies are considered as Samuelson pub-
lic goods, one can rely on Gourdel (1995) for conditions of existence of public goods private
provision equilibrium in nonconvex production economies,13 on Bonnisseau (1991) for con-
ditions of existence of Lindahl equilibria in the same model, on Kahn–Vohra (1987) for
the extension of the second welfare theorem to economies with nonconvexities and public
goods, on Murty (2006) for the extension to the nonconvex case of the Wicksell–Foley
public competitive equilibrium concept. As in the convex case, public goods private pro-
vision equilibrium exists but is not optimal. Lindahl equilibrium exists but, unlike in the
convex case, is not necessarily Pareto optimal. As in the convex case, consumers’ Lindahl
prices and lump sum transfers exist for decentralization of optimal Lindahl–Foley feasible
allocations.14
12Some of them as Villanacci and Zenginobuz (2005) have completely generalized the B-B-V model and
its conclusions. See also subsequent papers of Villanacci–Zenginobuz and their references.
13Like Shafer–Sonnenschein (1976), when extending equilibrium existence in nonconvex production
economies to dependent consumers’ preferences, Gourdel does not refer to the externality inherent to the
public goods private provision but to more general dependences of preferred sets on the current allocation
and prices.
14It is in this framework that one should re-visit the old controversy, referred to at the end of Section 3,
on entry fees versus lump sum transfers for financing the deficit of regulated firms.
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Under convexity on the consumption side, whether public goods be produced by a
convex or a nonconvex technology, the other drawbacks of the equilibrium concepts for
their provision are today exactly the ones pointed out in 1954 by Samuelson.
On the one hand, Pareto improved or not by government interventions, public goods
private provision equilibrium fails, by definition, to be Pareto optimal. And this holds
true whatever be the incentives one may invoke for more Pareto satisfactory individual
consumers’ donations.
On the other hand, general equilibrium theorists are unanimously ready to stress, like
Mas-Colell (1980), Silvestre (2003), the implausibility of competitive markets with Lindahl
prices for public goods. Revealing his ‘willingness to pay” at Lindahl–Foley equilibrium is
not a plausible equilibrium consumers’ behavior, since it is not a best strategy for every
consumer. In other words, according to the terminology of mechanism design theory, the
main drawback of Lindahl–Foley equilibrium is not to be ‘incentive compatible’.
Moreover, as also pointed out by Samuelson (1954), implementing with Lindahl prices
and lump-sum transfers or taxes a desired Pareto optimal Lindahl–Foley feasible allocation
would require, for their calculation by a hypothetical coordinating center, government’s
perfect information on consumers’ preferences. An analogous difficulty holds true with
planning procedures a` la Dre`ze–La Valle´e Poussin (Dre`ze–La Valle´e Poussin 1971) or
Malinvaud (Malinvaud 1972). Such planning procedures rule the exchange of information
between a ‘central board’ (central agency, government, whatever) and the economic agents,
consumers and (convex) producers,15 in a process operating in continuous time whose
convergence should lead to an equilibrium relative to a system of private goods prices and
Lindahl prices for public goods, thus to a Pareto optimal Lindahl–Foley feasible allocation.
In a kind of ‘Walras taˆtonnement’, at each stage of such procedures, the indicators issued
by the board are an amount of public goods provision together with production prices of
all goods and an amount of nume´raire left to consumers for their expenditure on private
goods. In response, consumers declare their private goods demand and their marginal
willingness to pay for the proposed public goods consumption, while producers declare
a profit maximizing net supply of private and public goods. Rules of revision of next
stage board’s indicators as a function of consumers and producers’ proposals complete
the specification of the dynamic procedure. Besides desirable properties of the different
processes, in particular their convergence towards a satisfactory allocation, the possibility
of implementing the procedure requires for the board knowledge, at each stage of the
process, of consumers’ marginal willingness to pay for the proposed public goods provision,
an information that consumers may have incentives for under-reporting. The possibility
and the design of procedures implying incentives for correct reporting of these marginal
rates is thus an important concern for the study of planning procedures in the management
15Mas-Colell (1980) specifies an analogous procedure in the more general case of public projects produced
with nonconvex technologies.
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of public goods provision, as it is more generally an important concern for mechanism
design theory and its contribution to understanding and modeling the provision of public
goods.
6 Are mechanisms providing better foundations for public
policy of public goods provision in market economies?
6.1 What is mechanism design theory?
Mechanism design theory traces back to discussion papers of Hurwicz at the Cowles Foun-
dation in the first years of development of general equilibrium theory,16 successively sum-
marized in some seminal papers (Hurwicz 1960, 1972, 1979). A constant reference is done
in the beginning to the Barone, Mises, von Hayek, Lange and Lerner debates concern-
ing the economics of socialism, as well as to the different formalizations of Walrasian
taˆtonnement process. When applied to the resource allocation problem in a society, a con-
stant objective of this new formalization of social and economic interaction is to provide
a coherent framework encompassing competitive equilibrium as a particular example of
mechanism.
What is first meant under different names given for mechanisms in Hurwicz’s papers
is the design of a process leading, through the collection of decentralized information,
to a desired resource allocation. The conceptual framework
(
N, (Mi)i∈N , Z,Φ, (fi)i∈N
)
consists of a set of agents N with or without a coordination center, a space of messages
M = ∏i∈N Mi, a space of outcomes Z, for example the set of all (not necessarily feasi-
ble) resource allocations in some economy, on which agents have individual preferences,
a pre-specified function Φ: M → Z assigning outcomes for every collection of received
messages. With M and Φ, rules for revision of individual messages, fi : M→Mi, com-
plete the definition of the process and define a dynamic adjustment process which should
converge towards an element m ∈M, the equilibrium of the process, with an image Φ(m)
belonging to a certain class of desirable outcomes. But there is also a more static definition
of the equilibrium of a mechanism given by Hurwicz (1979). The mechanism is the game
form
(
N, (M)i∈N , Z,Φ
)
. Given individual agents’ preferences on Z and, according to a
given game theoretic equilibrium notion, the equilibrium should yield a desirable outcome.
In both cases, processes and mechanisms should be, as much as possible, informationally
decentralized, which implies an initial dispersion of information among the agents and
limited communication. The resulting outcome should have certain optimality properties
relative to individual agents’ preferences on the different outcomes. Finally, the rules pre-
scribed by the mechanism should be compatible with either individual or group incentives
based on their own interest, and individual participation to the mechanism should be
16Available at cowles.econ.yale.edu/P/ccdp/ccdp1.htm
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voluntary. In view of these requirements, one understands that, as written by Hurwicz ,
“unlike in the more traditional approach, the mechanism becomes (for its designer) the
unknown of the problem rather than a datum” (Hurwicz 1960).
According to the previous definitions, it is obvious that competitive equilibrium of a
private ownership economy is, under classical assumptions, a kind of Nash equilibrium for
a static mechanism involving the addition of an artificial player called Walrasian ‘auction-
eer’. The same is true for Lindahl–Foley equilibrium of an economy with public goods.
The interest of the static mechanisms proposed in Hurwicz (1979) is not to require any
auctioneer. The various dynamic models of market processes and also the different decen-
tralized planning models, including the planning procedures studied above for an optimal
provision of public goods, are examples of dynamic mechanisms. All these processes and
mechanisms are informationally decentralized (the message sent by each agent requires
only information on its own characteristics and does not allow any agent to infer com-
plete information on other agents’ characteristics), satisfy static or dynamic optimality
(the first and second welfare theorems are satisfied), participation is voluntary (the result-
ing outcome is individually rational, that is, preferable to the initial allocation), at least
under the Foley assumptions, for mechanisms leading to a Lindahl–Foley equilibrium.
But they need not satisfy individual incentive compatibility, a requirement present in the
first papers of Hurwicz but whose formal statement was of difficult elaboration. Roughly
speaking, the response function prescribed to each player by each of these mechanisms is
not a best strategy for agents who may have interest to give false signals on their own
characteristics.17
6.2 Dominant strategy mechanisms for public goods provision (1970–80)
The search for incentive compatible mechanisms for public goods provision has been one
of the first points of application of mechanism design theory, in relation with the free-rider
problem.18
The condition for incentive compatibility corresponds to the requirement that equilib-
rium in dominant strategies be the solution concept adopted for the mechanism. For an
agent, a strategy is dominant if it is a best strategy no matter what are the strategies
17As explained by Samuelson, this is obvious for Lindahl equilibrium. But, as noticed several times by
Hurwicz, this is also true in some sense for competitive equilibrium of an economy with only private goods
and a finite number of agents, since these agents would be better off manipulating prices rather than being
price takers. Consumers’ myopia is necessary to the general equilibrium welfare analysis.
18Later, Danziger and Schnytzer (1991) will define a public good economy whose Lindahl–Foley equi-
librium emerges, under rather restrictive assumptions, as the perfect equilibrium of a two-stage non co-
operative game where consumers freely announce subsidy prices for the public goods private provision of
the other players and the quantity of public goods they wish to purchase on a private basis. As individual
preferences are common knowledge, this kind of mechanism - a good candidate for solving the free rider
problem while satisfying the voluntary participation criterion - is not informationally decentralized.
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chosen by the other agents. And a mechanism is dominant strategy incentive compati-
ble or strongly individually incentive compatible if truthfully reporting is for each agent a
dominant strategy, that is, an optimal strategy irrespective of the strategies chosen by the
other agents.
For public goods provision, dominant strategy incentive compatibility is generally
stated in the partial equilibrium setting of a decision on a public project with a (already
known) cost in nume´raire to be financed by collecting contributions (taxes and transfers)
from different agents having quasi-linear utility functions on the public goods provision
versus their allocation of nume´raire.
Namely, X is a set of possible public projects in an economy with a unique private
good (the nume´raire) and a set N of individuals. Simultaneously with the public goods
provision corresponding to the public project, one considers positive or negative monetary
transfers (ti)i∈N . Each individual i ∈ N has preferences on X represented by a valuation
function vi : X → R, net of the imputed costs, and a utility function ui : X × R→ R:
ui(x, ti) = vi(x) + ti
sum of his valuation and of the monetary transfer he receives. A revelation mechanism is a
mechanism in which each agent i ∈ N communicates a valuation function, not necessarily
his true one, belonging to some set Vi of admissible valuation functions. The message
space is thus M = ∏i∈N Vi. The outcome rule, Φ: M → X × RN , associates with
each list of messages w = (wi) ∈ M, Φ(w) =
(
Φx(w),Φt(w)
)
, where Φx(w) specifies
the accepted project and Φt(w) specifies a list of monetary transfers (ti(w))i∈N between
a central agency and the agents i ∈ N . The revelation mechanism is a direct revelation
mechanism if, for each list of messages w = (wi)i∈N , the corresponding level of public goods
Φx(w) maximizes on X the total social value
∑
i∈N wi(x). The mechanism is said to be
strongly incentive compatible if truth telling is a dominant strategy for each individual,
that is, if for each i ∈ N
ui
(
Φ(w−i, vi)
) ≥ ui(Φ(w−i, wi)) ∀w−i ∈∏
j 6=i
Vj , ∀wi ∈ Vi .
Clarke in 1971 (Clarke 1971), Groves in 1973 (Groves 1973), Groves and Loeb in 1975
(Groves–Loeb 1975) demonstrated that a class of direct revelation mechanisms19 exists in
which truth telling is a dominant strategy for each agent.
Unfortunately, maximization of the social surplus does not mean Pareto optimality of
the outcome
(
Φx
(
(vi)i∈N
)
,Φt
(
(vi)i∈N
))
. Indeed, recall that individual utility functions
have two arguments and express the personal trade off of each agent between the utility
19A class that Green and Laffont have characterized in 1977 (Green–Laffont 1977) when the set X of
public projects is compact and every continuous function v : X → R is an admissible valuation function.
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(net of cost) of the public project and the individual amount of money ti he receives (ti ≥ 0)
from the central agency or pays (ti < 0) to the central agency. Since quasi-linear utility
functions are strictly monotone with respect to nume´raire, Pareto optimality requires the
equilibrium transfers to be balanced, that is,
∑
i∈N Φt
(
(vi)i∈N
)
= 0. The Clarke-Groves
mechanisms need not satisfy this condition and thus do not necessarily lead to a Pareto
optimal outcome.
6.3 Nash incentive compatibility as a solution to the free-rider problem
(1977–80)
With a less restrictive condition for incentive compatibility, Groves and Ledyard (1977)
address this problem in the classical model of a private ownership economy with public
goods defined in Section 4. As explained in the introduction to their paper, the mechanism
designed by Groves–Ledyard consists of appending to this model an explicit procedure for
determining consumers’ demand for public goods and their tax burdens. It requires the
definition of a space of messages M =
∏
i∈I Mi for consumers and of an hypothetical
agent, the ‘government’,20 which sets the provision G(m, p, pg) of public goods and the
individual contributions of consumers ti(m, p, pg) as a function of the collection of messages
m = (mi)i∈I sent by consumers and the current market prices (p, pg) for private and public
goods. An equilibrium of the mechanism is a list
(
m, (p, pg), ((xi)i∈I , G), (yj , y
g
j )j∈J
)
of
a collection of messages, a non null price vector and an allocation of the public goods
economy such that
• markets clear for private goods and the provision G = G(m, p, pg) of public goods
• each producer j maximizes at (yj , ygj ) his profit (p · yj + pg · ygj )
• each consumer i optimizes his preferences relative to private and public goods in the
budget set21{
(xi,mi) ∈ Xi ×Mi : p · xi + ti
(
(mi,m−i), p, pg
) ≤ p · ωi +∑
j∈J
θij(p · yj + pg · ygj )
}
.
Groves and Ledyard give first two examples of mechanisms, one with a so-called ‘naive’
government leading to a public goods private provision equilibrium, a second one with a
so-called ‘Lindahl’ government leading to a Lindahl–Foley equilibrium whose achievement
requires from the consumers to truthfully report their marginal rate of substitution be-
tween each public good and some nume´raire private good. Each one of these examples
20In probable addition to the Walrasian auctioneer which should guarantee in the existence proof the
feasibility of the equilibrium allocation.
21It is worth noticing that in consumer i’s budget set, ti
`
(mi,m−i), p, pg
´
represents for i the equilibrium
value of her own message given the equilibrium messages m−i of the other consumers.
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suffers the drawbacks of the two equilibrium concepts: sub-optimality of the resulting allo-
cation in the first case, lack of incentive compatibility in the second one. This motivates the
main result of the paper consisting in the definition of two ‘optimal’ mechanisms22 proved
to lead to Pareto optimal allocations, and such that, at equilibrium, it is each consumer’s
individual self-interest to reveal his true valuation for or demand of the public goods. In
addition, the second mechanism allows for a decentralization of Pareto optimal allocations
through the redistribution of initial endowments and shares of profits. These results are
by no means immediate and are completed by a mechanism equilibrium existence result
which can be found in (Groves–Ledyard 1980).23
The decade 1970-80 will finish with various impossibility theorems for public goods
provision mechanisms (Green–Laffont 1979, Hurwicz–Walker 1990, Walker 1980), deeply
connected with the general impossibility theorems in voting and social choice theory.
In the partial equilibrium setting of a decision on a public project and the schemes of
transfers for the distribution of its cost, a truth-dominant mechanism either fails to be
social value maximizing or fails to be budget balancing; under suitable assumptions, this
negative result is ‘generic’, that is, holds for an open and dense set of valuation profiles in∏
i∈N Vi. In the general equilibrium setting of public goods provision, the Groves–Ledyard
mechanism might require some agents to be coerced into participating.
Such negative results created interest in less demanding notions of incentive compat-
ibility based on the intermediary solution concept of Nash equilibrium in a model where
participants have beliefs concerning each other and are expected-utility maximizers.
6.4 Bayesian mechanisms for public goods provision (1979–90)
Let us first come back to the partial equilibrium setting of a decision on a public project
studied in the paragraph 6.2 and denote by vi(x, θi) the valuation function of agent i ∈ N
for the public project x, depending on the value of a parameter θi ∈ Θi. The space Θi
represents the set of possible types of agents i; θ̂i ∈ Θi identifies agent i’s tastes for of
the agent i. The message space can be rewritten M = ∏i∈N Θi and the outcome rule,
Φ: M→ X ×RN , associates with each θ = (θi) ∈M, Φ(θ) =
(
Φx(θ),Φt(θ)
)
where Φx(θ)
specifies the accepted project and Φt(θ) a list of monetary transfers (ti(θ) to agents i ∈ N .
The incentive compatibility constraint of the previous paragraph can be rewritten:
vi
(
Φx(θ−i, θ̂i), θ̂i
)
+Φt(θ−i, θ̂i) ≥ vi
(
Φx(θ−i, θi), θ̂i
)
+Φt(θ−i, θi) : ∀i ∈ N ; ∀θ ∈
∏
i∈N
ΘI .
22In the first one, each message space is a space of differentiable and strictly concave functionsmi : RK+ →
R representing individual valuation functions for public goods; in the second one, Mi = RK , each mi
representing an individual claim for public goods provision.
23Equilibrium is proved to exist under standard assumptions on the public goods economy, with in
addition a condition on the parameters of the mechanism and a technical condition whose role is to prevent
consumers to go to bankruptcy under the government taxation when other consumers are in equilibrium.
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In the Bayesian model associated with this formalization, the agents have beliefs on the
other agent’s characteristics conditional to their own type, that is, subjective probabilities
pi(·|θi) on
∏
j 6=iΘj known only when their own type θi is also known. A strategy is a
decision rule associating a unique strategy choice mi(θi) to each of his possible types. A
Bayesian Nash equilibrium is a n-uple of strategies such that, whatever be his type, each
agent maximizes the mathematical expectation of the utility of the corresponding outcome,
assuming that the other agents will not change their strategy. Finally, a mechanism is
Bayesian incentive compatible if the n-uple of strategies m = (mi)i∈N defined by for all i,
mi(θi) = θi is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium, that is, if
E[vi
(
Φx(θ˜−i, θi), θi
)
+Φt(θ˜−i, θi)|θi] ≥ E[vi
(
Φx(θ˜−i, θ′i), θi
)
+Φt(θ˜−i, θ′i)|θi]
for all i, θ˜−i ∈
∏
j 6=iΘj and θ
′
i ∈ Θi. In other words, for every agent i ∈ N and every
possible type θi ∈ Θi, sending as a message this information to the center dominates every
other possible message whenever the other agents have presumably the same behavior.24
The existence of a Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism enabling to solve ef-
ficiently a collective decision problem and to ensure budget balancing was proved by
D’Aspremont and Gerard-Varet (1979) when the sets Θi are finite, under a compati-
bility condition on individual beliefs and other mild conditions. However, as remarked
later (Maylath–Postlewaite 1990), their mechanism typically violates the voluntary par-
ticipation constraint of individual rationality. If participation is voluntary, the problem of
free-riding may become severe, which extends to incentive compatible and individually ra-
tional direct revelation mechanisms the negative Samuelson conjecture on the impossibility
of a decentralized optimal provision of public goods.
6.5 The shift to second best analysis and the correlative dissolution of
the figure of social planner (1979– )
Obviously, the papers reported in the three previous paragraphs are in some sense sem-
inal. Subsequently, the public goods provision problem has been studied based on other
frameworks (voting games, perfect equilibrium of two-stage games, ...) and/or applied to
several extended settings allowing for large economies, more complex systems of informa-
tion parameters, the possibility of exclusion or costly access to public goods, and diverse
possibilities of renegotiation of the allocation corresponding to the government message.
The recurrent theme that comes out of this huge literature is still the difficulty of finding
informationally decentralized, incentive compatible mechanisms that simultaneously result
in decisions maximizing the total welfare, the voluntary participation of the individuals,
and balanced transfers.
24A stronger incentive compatibility notion can be defined in terms of dominant strategy equilibrium.
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Around the same time, and still in the context of decentralized information, a ‘second
best’ formulation, using the principal–agent framework, allows for more successful appli-
cations of mechanism design theory. In contrast to the first generation of incentive models
which were concerned with the possibility or impossibility of implementing (‘first best’)
Pareto optimal outcomes, the principal–agent analysis begins with the identification of
a set of incentive compatible (for the agents) mechanisms, before choosing among them
according to the objectives of the principal.25 As the principal may be as well a social
planner caring about efficiency and distributive criteria as a private self-interested agent
maximizing some payoff, the mechanism design theory has henceforth largely deserted the
field of optimal public goods provision analysis, and more generally the early questions
raised by Hurwicz concerning the optimal allocation of resources in classical and non-
classical environments of an economy, for focussing on the solution of a great variety of
useful applications in different branches of economics.
The main applications concern the design of auctions, bargaining, exchange and reg-
ulation mechanisms. A fruitful application of the study of regulation mechanisms is its
contribution to foundations of a theory of the firm. But mechanism design may also be
used for the regulation by a social planner of a monopoly utility provider26, the control of a
polluting producer, and more generally in several problems where externalities are present.
Mechanism design is thus not absent from normative analyses in public economics.
7 Concluding
At their true beginning, mechanism design, under the influence of Hurwicz, and, to a
slightly lesser degree, general equilibrium had both a lucid vision of the fact that modern
capitalist economies are mixed economies. It is for the public policy of such economies
that Musgrave (1959) defined the three levels of planning (allocation, distribution, sta-
bilization) which correspond to the government tasks that we have summarized in the
introduction under the words of ‘common representation’ in this time of the role of the
State. Fifty years after, despite the sum of theoretical efforts to prove the contrary, the
first obvious conclusion of this historical survey is the impossibility of a total absence
of state intervention in the optimal production and/or provision of public goods. From
equilibrium to mechanism design, the difference is in the role and the objectives assigned
to this intervention.
Whatever be the normative or positive character of their analysis, the general equi-
librium models studied in Section 4 without reference to Samuelson’s definition of public
25In his survey of mechanism design theory and his explanation of the role played by Leonid Hurwicz,
Eric Maskin and Roger Meyerson in the development of this field, Mookerjee (2008) attributes to the large
number of impossibility results this shift in the way the key questions have to be posed and the reversal
of the sequence of analysis.
26Privately informed of its (variable) cost of production.
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goods assume or call for state intervention. For instance, the implementation of pricing
rules associated in the nonconvex production sector with optimal allocations calls for pub-
lic production of public utilities or for appending procedures of mechanism design to the
general equilibrium model in order to guide the behavior of agencies in charge of their
production.
When starting from Samuelson’s definition of public goods, neither general equilib-
rium nor mechanism design have taken up the challenges raised by Samuelson’s paper. In
the equilibrium process that determines simultaneously the public goods optimal provi-
sion and financing, the notion of the consumer so distributing his income as to maximize
satisfactions that originate from private and public goods consumption is maybe the ‘orig-
inal error’.27 Focussing more and more on information revelation problems and making
of incentive compatibility of essentially selfish individual behaviors the main requirement
for an appropriate public policy of market economies, equilibrium theory and mechanism
design have led, for one half of century, to the same negative conclusion on the impossi-
bility of a fully decentralized (first best) optimal public goods provision through market
or market-like institutions.
Called for defining signals and procedures, appended to the general equilibrium model,
which could guide the decentralized behavior of the agents, the mechanism design theory
locates the role of the government in the design and the enforcement of such procedures.
The difficulties of their implementation, in particular concerning the public goods pro-
vision, are the subject of a last paper of Hurwicz (Hurwicz 2008). As noted by Lee
(2006), far from replacing general equilibrium theory, “the mechanism design theory pro-
vides the dominant Walrasian general equilibrium tradition with a new transpersonal,
algorithm-centered vision of markets/organizations/institutions”, leaving unsolved the lin-
gering problems associated with this tradition (here, the impossibility of a fully decentral-
ized public goods provision).
What is insufficiently quoted by Lee, and explains for us the shift in the vision of
public policy offered today by the general equilibrium and mechanism design theories,
is the increasing influence of the principal–agent setting and the agency theory. To the
idea of a central planner is substituted the proliferation of decentralized principals which
reflects the multiplicity today of (eventually) public objectives quoted in the introduction.
The elaboration of these objectives could contribute to redefining the role of the State.
Such an effort is neither in the ambition nor in the abilities of this paper.
27Recall that for Galbraith (Galbraith 1967, chapter XIX, The Revised Sequence), the assumption that
sovereignty of consumers is the driving force of economic equilibrium was not of original error but of
obsolescence.
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Abstract
This paper investigates to what extent the seminal contribution of Samuelson (1954) has
been or not incorporated by the theories of general equilibrium and mechanism design
in their analysis of optimal public good provision and more generally of optimal public
policy. Our conclusion is that, far from taking up the challenges raised by Samuelson’s
contribution, both paradigms lead to the negative conclusion of the impossibility of a fully
decentralized optimal public goods provision through market or market-like institutions,
without giving a key for (re)defining the role of state in market economies.
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